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INTRODUCTION 
It is a commonly held myth that the rise of U.S. global economic 
hegemony rests upon a free trade philosophy.1 On the contrary, protec-
tionist trade policies were central to galvanizing American industrializa-
tion.2 This misconception lies at the heart of why the trade liberalization 
policies enforced under the U.S.-led Bretton Woods institutions, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), brought ruinous 
results to many poor countries.3 The subsequent decline in credibility of 
                                                        
 1. See, e.g., Michael Lind, The Cost of Free Trade, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2011, at 52, available 
at https://prospect.org/article/cost-free-trade (explaining the fact vs. myth dynamic regarding the 
origins of U.S. economic power, Lind argues that “[t]he belief that greater liberalization of trade and 
investment must invariably benefit the American economy in the long run, no matter its short-term 
costs in terms of crippled industries and lost jobs, has become an article of faith for America’s bipar-
tisan establishment for more than 50 years”). After all, both major American political parties have 
made trade liberalization a major party platform in the post-Cold War era; indeed, the liberalization 
of trade has been one of the only policy issues that recent Republican and Democratic presidents 
have agreed upon writ large. Id. 
 2. The adoption of protectionist policies made much sense for an industrializing nation in the 
nineteenth century, and protectionist trade policies were central to galvanizing American industriali-
zation, as U.S. manufacturers sought to insulate themselves from competition from more established 
British manufacturers. Thus, support for protectionist policies was a key plank of the Whig, then 
Republican, platform from the early nineteenth century until 1952. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln se-
cured Pennsylvania’s decisive electoral votes in the election of 1860 through his support of a tariff 
designed to aid Pennsylvania manufacturers. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900, at 457–509 (2000) (providing a detailed 
historical analysis of the importance of protectionist trade policies in spurring the American Indus-
trial Revolution). See generally J. B. CONDLIFFE, THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS (1st ed. 1950); JOHN 
M. DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS 11, 15, 17, 35, 38, 89 (1976); ALFRED E. ECKES, JR., 
OPENING AMERICA’S MARKET (1995); PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN 
QUESTION 27 (2d ed. 1999). 
 3. See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall et al., The Washington Consensus: Assessing a Damaged Brand 20 
(Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 211,  2010), available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/ 
default/files/1424155_file_Birdsall_Torre_Caicedo_Assessing_the_WC_FINAL_0.pdf. The authors 
assess the negative impacts of Bretton Woods policies in the Latin American region, and note: 
[W]ith the exception of Chile, outcomes during the 1990s generally fell signif-
icantly short of the reformers’ expectations. Even if inequality is not consid-
ered, growth and poverty reduction outcomes were disheartening when com-
pared to the intensity of the reform effort. . . . The sense of disenchantment 
with the Washington Consensus deepened dramatically in the late-1990s and 
early-2000s when the region was hit by a wave of financial turbulence that 
pushed several countries into crippling twin (banking and currency) crises, in-
cluding Ecuador (1999–2000), Argentina (2001–2002), Uruguay (2002) and 
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these institutions challenges their continued relevance and opens a space 
for powerful nations to fashion alternative rules of trade.4  
China is a member of the IMF but has only 3.8% of the voting 
share of the institution—the same power as Italy, whose economy is five 
times smaller.5 Consequently, China is now developing its own set of 
financial institutions to rival the Bretton Woods institutions6 and is build-
ing Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with countries in its emerging sphere 
of influence in the South China Sea.7 
The reduction in credibility of the Bretton Woods regulatory order 
has affected the U.S.’s outsize ability to influence the economic architec-
ture of global trade.8 As a result, the United States is seeking to meet the 
                                                                                                                            
the Dominican Republic (2003). Not surprisingly, during 2001–2003 per capi-
ta income growth in the region was negative even as other regions in the 
world enjoyed positive growth. 
Id. 
 4. See Jeremy Tordjman, China’s Economic Rise Challenges the IMF’s Relevance, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-chinas-economic-rise-challenges-the-
imfs-relevance-2014-10. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-
into-us-opposition.html (discussing China’s efforts to create parallel institutions to the World Bank 
and IMF). 
 7 . As of early 2015, China had signed bilateral and multilateral FTAs with ten coun-
tries/regions: Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Costa 
Rica, and ASEAN10. ASEAN10 is a political and economic organization, organized under a FTA, 
of ten Southeast Asian countries. It was formed on August 8, 1967, by Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Since then, membership has expanded to include Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam and whose aims include accelerating economic growth, 
social progress, sociocultural evolution among its members, protection of regional peace and stabil-
ity, and opportunities for member countries to discuss differences peacefully. See Overview, ASS’N 
OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).  
 China is also negotiating with the following nations/regions on the possibility of signing bilat-
eral FTAs: Australia, Iceland, South Korea, Norway, Switzerland, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
and Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Furthermore, the Chinese government is asking 
research centers within the central government and government-affiliated think tanks to conduct 
research on the possibility of negotiating FTAs with Japan and India. Jianmin Jin, China’s Concerns 
Regarding TPP No More than Empty Worries?, FUJITSU RESEARCH INST. (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.fujitsu.com/jp/group/fri/en/column/message/2012/2012-01-11.html. 
 8. See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 223–31 
(2007) (discussing the role of the Bretton Woods institutions and their negative impact on economic 
stability). Klein notes that this arrangement provided the U.S. with “effective veto power over all 
major decisions,” and argues that “when Reagan . . . came to power in the eighties, [his] highly 
ideological administration [was] essentially able to harness the two institutions for [the U.S.’s] own 
ends, rapidly increasing their power and turning them into the primary vehicles for the advancement 
of the corporatist crusade.” Id. at 223–24; see also Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The 
Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 723 (1999) 
(noting that the World Bank’s worldview has translated into a record of development failures); Dan-
iel D. Bradlow, Rapidly Changing Functions and Slowly Evolving Structures: The Troubling Case of 
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challenge of growing Chinese power by establishing its own network of 
FTAs. FTAs have become a key foreign-policy plank used to structure 
the architecture of global trade and increase geopolitical influence. Nota-
bly, FTAs contain provisions that maintain protective tariffs on imports 
from nonmember states, which run counter to the global free market phi-
losophy of the Bretton Woods institutions.9 The U.S. and China are thus 
engaged in a zero-sum game to rewrite the rules of global trade for the 
post-Bretton Woods world. The goal is to establish enough FTAs to 
achieve regional economic hegemony.10 This “pivot to Asia”11 animates 
U.S. interests12 in leading ongoing negotiations among twelve Pacific 
                                                                                                                            
the IMF, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 152, 155 (2000) (contending that the IMF governance structure 
vests power in decision makers “with accountability to people who do not have to live with the con-
sequences of their decisions but without accountability to those most affected by their decisions”); 
Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005) (noting NGOs’ views that the World Bank lacks accountability by 
not having to answer to those whom its policies affect); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital-Market Liberali-
zation, Globalization, and the IMF, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 63 (2004) (discussing how IMF-
backed, capital-market liberalization led to economic instability); Ngaire Woods, Making the IMF 
and the World Bank More Accountable, 77 INT’L AFF. 83, 83 (2001) (asserting that the IMF and 
World Bank are “secretive, unaccountable, and ineffective”). 
 9. See Lind, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Mireya Solis, The Geopolitical Importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: At Stake, 
a Liberal Economic Order, BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2015),  
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/03/13-geopolitical-importance-
transpacific-partnership (arguing that due the stagnation of the WTO, a member of the Bretton 
Woods international order, “we have moved to a system of decentralized competition where differ-
ent clusters of countries seek to define the standards for economic integration); see also Jane Perlez, 
Clinton Makes Effort to Rechannel the Rivalry With China, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/world/asia/ 
for-clinton-an-effort-to-rechannel-the-rivalry-with-china.html (reporting that China has now sur-
passed the United States to become ASEAN’s largest trading partner by going from being an incon-
sequential trading partner in the region as recently as the late 1990s to a two-way trade volume of 
$293 billion in 2010); John Lee, China’s ASEAN Invasion, NAT’L INTEREST, May-June 2007, at 89 
(providing a more detailed explanation of China’s FTA strategy by an Australian analyst who sup-
ports American military primacy in Asia). 
 11. See MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42448, PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC? 
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S ‘REBALANCING’ TOWARD ASIA (2012), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf (discussing the TPP initiative as consistent with the 
Obama Administration’s articulation of its geopolitical objectives in the Chinese sphere of influ-
ence). 
 12. See, e.g., TPP = New World Order, C-SPAN (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?c4414245/tpp-new-world-order. Characterizing the TPP and its benefits to the United States, Vice 
President Joseph P. Biden argues: 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is perhaps the most ambitious trade negotiation 
underway in the world. It will break new ground on important issues from the 
challenges of state-owned enterprises, to ensuring the free flow of data across 
borders, to enhancing regional supply chains, to ensuring transparency in cut-
ting red tape. We’re also working to strengthen protections for labor and the 
environment. . . . Our goal is for high standards for the Trans-Pacific Partner-
 
2015] Rising to China's Challenge in the Pacific Rim 111 
Rim nations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will operate 
in the Chinese sphere of influence and redesign the economic architec-
ture for 40% of global trade.13 
While traditional critics14 of FTAs highlight the potential negative 
effects on U.S. labor15 and the dangers of increasing corporate power,16 
the animating force of the TPP is not built upon a free trade philosophy.17 
Rather, the animating force rests upon the U.S.’s realpolitik18 goal of 
restraining the rise of Chinese hegemony and ensuring adherence to the 
international rule of law, customs, and norms established during the Bret-
ton Woods regulatory order.19 Notably excluded from the TPP negotia-
                                                                                                                            
ship to enter the bloodstream of the global system and improve the rules and 
norms. 
Id. 
 13. See Lydia DePillis, Everything You Need to Know About the Trans Pacific Partnership, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/11/ 
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-trans-pacific-partnership/. 
 14. See, e.g., Kevin Zeese & Margaret Flowers, Civil Society, Environmentalists Firmly Op-
posed to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), GLOBAL RES. (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/civil-society-environmentalists-firmly-opposed-to-trans-pacific-
partnership-tpp/5441486. 
 15. See David Nakamura, AFL-CIO Head on Obama’s Trade Push: ‘We Are Going All Out to 
Oppose It’, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/ 
2015/03/10/afl-cio-boss-on-obamas-trade-push-we-are-going-all-out-to-oppose-it/. 
 16. See Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-
language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_ 
story.html (“ISDS [Investor-State Dispute Settlement clause] would allow foreign companies to 
challenge U.S. laws—and potentially to pick up huge payouts from taxpayers—without ever step-
ping foot in a U.S. court. . . . Agreeing to ISDS in this enormous new treaty would tilt the playing 
field in the United States further in favor of big multinational corporations.”).  
 17. See IAN F. FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP (TPP) NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2015), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf. Highlighting the TPP’s potential implications beyond U.S. 
economic interests in the Pacific Rim, the report notes: 
Throughout the post-World War II period, the region has served as an anchor 
of U.S. strategic relationships, first in the containment of communism and 
more recently as a counterweight to the rise of China. This trend has recently 
been accentuated by the Obama Administration’s ‘pivot to Asia,’ along with 
the perception that the center of gravity of U.S. foreign, economic, and mili-
tary policy is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP is viewed as an im-
portant element in the U.S. “rebalancing” toward Asia. 
Id. at 7. 
 18. See Realpolitik: Philosophical Perspective, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www. 
britannica.com/topic/realpolitik (last visited June 12, 2015). Realpolitik is a brand of politics based 
on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean “real” in the English sense but 
rather connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to things as they are. Realpolitik thus sug-
gests a pragmatic, no-nonsense view and a disregard for ethical considerations. In diplomacy, it is 
often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest. Id. 
 19. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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tions is China, which covets regional economic hegemony.20  China’s 
exclusion from the TPP negotiations is not an accident, as recent Chinese 
initiatives aimed at creating parallel financial institutions21 represent an 
unambiguous effort to displace Western institutions and ideologies.22 
These actions are consistent with the public statements23 of China’s par-
amount leader, President Xi Jinping, who cares little for the Bretton 
Woods regulatory order,24 which China played no role in establishing,25 
and even less for its Western principles.26  
The success of the U.S.’s geopolitical strategy, however, is threat-
ened by the overzealous, extraterritorial application of a U.S. criminal 
law designed to curtail corporate bribery of foreign officials: the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The Obama Administration interprets the 
FCPA in a way that criminalizes the giving of gifts to foreign business 
persons employed by state-run enterprises. 
                                                        
 20. See Naazneen Barma et al., Wishing Away the World Without the West, WASH. POST (Nov. 
19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/19/wishing-away-the-
world-without-the-west/. Countering arguments that China is merely augmenting the Bretton Woods 
regulatory order, the authors argue: 
[W]e think it’s overly optimistic to assume that Chinese interests and behavior 
will conform quite so neatly to the post-WWII system. And, to put a finer 
point on it, we believe both logic and evidence are now frequently pointing in 
the opposite direction. The world already has an Asian Development Bank. It 
already has ASEAN. 
Id. The authors go on to argue: 
The point is to create an alternative set of ideas, institutions and rules that are 
aligned with a Chinese vision of how political economy and state power come 
together. And while that vision is very much a work in progress, our bet is that 
it’ll be sufficiently different from what you’ll find in “the West.” In fact, we 
think China and its friends in the emerging world have started espousing and 
living it. 
Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Carrie Gracie, The Credo: Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29788802. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Perlez, supra note 6. Perlez quotes He Fan, Assistant Director of the Institute of World 
Economics and Politics in Beijing, as saying, “China is more suspicious of the existing international 
institutions because China feels it was not one of the founders. . . . China feels a lack of ownership.” 
Id. 
 26. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER K. JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, 
DECODING CHINA’S EMERGING “GREAT POWER” STRATEGY IN ASIA (2014), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140603_Johnson_DecodingChinasEmerging_WEB.pdf  (offering a 
comprehensive analysis on the rise of Chinese hegemony and the strategic challenges it presents to 
the U.S. and the Pacific region). President Xi Jinping allegedly does not believe in “Western-style 
liberal democracy,” and regrets “the collapse of communist rule in Moscow.” See Gracie, supra note 
23. When asked why the Soviet Empire collapsed, Jinping responded, “No one had the balls to stand 
up for it.” Id. 
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The Obama Administration’s draconian enforcement of the FCPA 
threatens to undermine the success of the U.S.’s TPP policy objective, 
which is to design an economic architecture to counterbalance China’s 
regional and even global economic ambitions. 27  It does so by 
disincentivizing U.S. corporations from investing in the Chinese sphere 
of influence.28 The FCPA prohibits U.S. citizens, corporations, and their 
employees from giving “anything of value” to “foreign officials” in order 
to secure business advantages.29 The policy objective of the FCPA is to 
deter bribery to better aid the U.S. in building international economic and 
diplomatic alliances30—an objective similar to that of the TPP.31 Howev-
er, deeply-rooted cultural norms of gift-giving and the maintenance of 
personal relationships32  in many Asian TPP member states33  create a 
                                                        
 27. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 1. (“[The TPP] is a manifestation of the Admin-
istration’s ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific, and if concluded, may serve to shape the economic archi-
tecture of the region. . . . It has the potential to . . . establish regional rules on new policy issues 
facing the global economy . . . .”). 
 28. See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 
20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 421–22 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] (casting 
anti-bribery legislation as a form of cultural imperialism); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global 
Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 
280 (1997) [hereinafter Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market] (characterizing such legislation as 
culturally insensitive); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery 
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 351–56 (2010) 
(detailing the genesis of the FCPA); Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 
16, 1, 3–6, 4 n.14 (2000) (exploring, generally, the cultural clash that anti-bribery enforcement cre-
ates in developing countries). 
 29. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006). 
 30. See Spalding, supra note 28, at 357–58. 
 31. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 32. See, e.g., Thomas W. Dunfee & Danielle E. Warren, Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Anal-
ysis of Doing Business in China, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 191, 192 (2001) (discussing how “guanxi” is a 
complex term that represents the ancient Chinese belief in only doing business with those whom one 
already knows or has connections—and is the necessity of forming and maintaining these relation-
ships through a variety of means); Frederick Balfour, You Say Guanxi, I Say Schmoozing, BUS. WK., 
Nov. 19, 2007, at 84 (“Guanxi. It’s the first word any businessperson learns upon arriving in China. 
Loosely translated, guanxi means “connections” and, as any China veteran will tell you, it is the key 
to everything: securing a business license, landing a distribution deal, even finding that coveted 
colonial villa in Shanghai. Fortunes have been made and lost based on whether the seeker has good 
or bad guanxi, and in most cases a positive outcome has meant knowing the right government offi-
cial, a relationship nurtured over epic banquets and gallons of XO brandy.”). 
 33. See JAMES C. SCOTT, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION 10 (1972); Philip M. Nich-
ols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 257, 292–97 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable 
and Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Centu-
ry?, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 232–39 (1999). “According to Chris Pash, CEO of Asia Pulse, great 
ceremonial significance is attached to the giving and receiving of gifts in Asia, such that it’s ex-
tremely important to be familiar with the customs, nuances, and cultural taboos in various coun-
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business culture where the FCPA’s overly-broad conception of bribery 
occurs in the regular course of business. Gift-giving that would be 
termed bribery under the FCPA is not only common in the Pacific Rim, 
but is accepted as a valid means of doing business.34 Thus, the vague 
language of the statute creates a compliance minefield for U.S. business-
es operating in the Chinese sphere of influence.  
The FCPA, which calls for criminal fines of up to $2 million per 
violation, is strictly enforced by the courts.35 Recent cases have resulted 
in fines of over $1.6 billion, and courts have sentenced Americans to 
prison terms of up to fifteen years for major violations.36 Moreover, an 
indictment alone, not even a conviction, can lead to suspension of the 
right to transact business with the U.S. government.37 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
significantly increased enforcement efforts in recent years. Between 
2003 and 2006, for example, the DOJ and SEC brought a total of thirty-
                                                                                                                            
tries.” Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[i]n Japan, failure to tender appro-
priate summer and year end business gifts is considered ‘a terrible breach of etiquette.’” See Salbu, 
supra, at 237 (quoting DIANA ROWLAND, JAPANESE BUSINESS ETIQUETTE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
SUCCESS WITH THE JAPANESE 81 (1985)); see also Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Revisiting Corrupt Prac-
tices From a Market Perspective, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1021, 1082–83 (1998) (arguing that 
“[w]hen gift-giving is practiced universally, the whole society becomes inextricably networked in 
gift-giving practices, and such activities become an expected, customary gesture governing many 
activities”). Furthermore, “Korean culture stresses reciprocation as the foundation to interpersonal 
relationships.” Daniel Y. Tun, Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual 
and Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1071, 1084 (1996). Korean reciprocation comes 
in the form of chonji, an expression of gratitude usually in the form of gifts. See Agenda for a New 
Leader, ASIA WK., Mar. 13, 1998, at 14. 
 34. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Minxin Pei, Corruption Threatens 
China’s Future 2 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Policy Brief No. 55, 2007), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_pei_china_corruption_final.pdf (discussing the endemic 
nature of bribery in Chinese business practices, Pei notes that roughly “10 percent of government 
spending, contracts, and transactions is used as kickbacks and bribes or simply stolen”). 
 35. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Latin Node Inc., Pleads Guilty to Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Violation and Agrees to Pay $2 Million Criminal Fine (Apr. 7, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-318.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Control Components, Inc. Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay 
$18.2 Million Criminal Fine (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/ 
09-crm-754.html. 
 36. See Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, Exchange Act Release No. 2911, 94 S.E.C. Docket 2869 
(Dec. 15, 2008), available at 2008 WL 5221040; see also Edward Wyatt, Former Siemens Execu-
tives Are Charged with Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at B4; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned 
Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/ 
October/11-crm-1407.html. 
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 69–70 (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf; see also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 147 (2011). 
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two enforcement actions.38 By contrast, in 2010 alone, the DOJ and SEC 
brought seventy-four enforcement actions, up 85% from 2009.39 In addi-
tion, the amount of fines has increased dramatically over the past five 
years. In 2007, U.S. authorities levied FCPA-related fines of $87 mil-
lion.40 In 2010, the DOJ assessed $1.8 billion in aggregate FCPA penal-
ties, including fines and disgorgements.41 Moreover, a company cannot 
pay fines levied against individuals.42 
The vague language and strict enforcement of the FCPA conspire to 
disincentivize corporations from entering those TPP markets that the 
U.S. perceives to be more corrupt,43 and thus where it enforces the FCPA 
most strictly. One of the most negative ways in which FCPA enforce-
ment undermines the TPP is in its definition of what constitutes a “for-
eign official.” A federal court recently ruled that the question of whether 
an employee of a state-owned enterprise (SOE)44 is a foreign official is a 
fact-based inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances.45 Because 
SOEs are a primary feature of many TPP members’ economies,46 poten-
tially labeling all employees of an SOE as “foreign officials” 
disincentivizes U.S. corporations from investing in the region, because 
all such individuals could be potential sources of FCPA liability. 
The purpose of this Article is to provide a realpolitik argument for 
why the TPP furthers the U.S.’s geopolitical objectives in the Pacific 
Rim, to define how the U.S’s enforcement of the FCPA undercuts those 
                                                        
 38 . See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST, at i (2011), available at 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Old-Site-Files/FCPADigestJan2011.pdf. 
 39. Paul T. Friedman et al., 2010: Another Record-Breaking Year for FCPA Enforcement, 
Confirming “New Era”, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/ 
Uploads/Images/110112-FCPA-Enforcement.pdf. 
 40. Kevin Lombardo & Ginny Gomez, Anti-Corruption Programs are Critical for All Compa-
nies Doing Business Internationally, in INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY: FCPA UPDATE 2011, at 1 (2011). 
 41. Hearing on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Before the H. Jud. Comm., Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (testimony of George J. Terwilliger III, 
Esq.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Terwilliger06142011.pdf. 
 42. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 37, at 5. 
 43. The markets in question for the purposes of this article are the majority of the Asian coun-
tries negotiating the TPP: Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Vietnam. See also 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2014 (2014), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results. Transparency International’s perceptions index is 
considered the gold standard for tracking global corruption. 
 44. SOEs are “business entities established by central and local governments and whose super-
visory officials are from the government.” See OECD WORKING GROUP ON PRIVATISATION & 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED ASSETS, STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA: 
REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE 3 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance 
ofstate-ownedenterprises/42095493.pdf. 
 45. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006). 
 46. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 42. 
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objectives, and to recommend reforms to the FCPA that will align its 
enforcement with the policy objectives of the TPP. This Article proceeds 
in four parts. Part I establishes the basis of U.S. economic hegemony 
show why the U.S. is moving away from the Bretton Woods regulatory 
order toward FTAs. It also establishes why the rise of Chinese hegemony 
is a challenge to U.S. interests in the region. Part II contextualizes com-
peting U.S. and Chinese strategies that use FTAs to design the economic 
architecture of regional trade, and establishes the basis for why the TPP 
is a critical tool for achieving the U.S.’s geopolitical objective of fore-
stalling Chinese hegemony. Part III establishes how the U.S’s. enforce-
ment of the FCPA undercuts this geopolitical objective and, therefore, 
argues that the language of the FCPA should be amended to align its en-
forcement with this objective. Part III thus proposes the following rec-
ommendations for fixing the FCPA: (1) amend the FCPA to provide a 
safe harbor provision for those companies who voluntarily conduct inter-
nal investigations, disclose potential violations, and cooperate with gov-
ernment investigations; (2) prohibit the barring of an indicted company 
from doing business with the U.S. without a conviction; and (3) clarify 
the FCPA’s definitions of “anything of value,” “instrumentality,” and 
“foreign official.” These reforms would align the FCPA’s enforcement 
regime with the geopolitical objective of the TPP, which is to counter-
balance China’s efforts to create a hegemonic alternative to the U.S. in 
the Pacific Rim. 
I. THE VISIBLE HAND OF THE MARKET 
A. The Rise of American Hegemony 
There is consensus that protectionist trade policies distort markets 
and are anathema to the global free trade47 ideology that lies at the heart 
of American power.48 However, there is little acknowledgment that the 
rise of American hegemony is rooted in intentionally designed protec-
tionist trade policies that distorted global markets in favor of U.S. eco-
nomic interests.49 Indeed, in the mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. was 
one of the most protectionist nations in the world.50 Speaking to a crowd 
of Pennsylvania citizens and their representatives on the way to his inau-
guration in February 1861, then-President-elect Lincoln advocated for 
the protective tariff: 
                                                        
 47. For the purposes of this Article, “free trade” is synonymous with “trade liberalization.” 
 48. See Lind, supra note 1. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
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[I]f I have any recommendation to make, it will be that every man 
who is called upon to serve the people in a representative capacity, 
should study this whole subject thoroughly, as I intend to do myself, 
looking to all the varied interests of our common country, so that 
when the time for action arrives adequate protection can be extend-
ed to the coal and iron of Pennsylvania, the corn of Illinois and the 
“reapers of Chicago.” Permit me to express the hope that this im-
portant subject may receive such consideration at the hands of your 
representatives, that the interests of no part of the country may be 
overlooked, but that all sections may share in common the benefits 
of a just and equitable tariff.51 
While Lincoln occupied the White House, Congress passed tariff 
increase after tariff increase, and Lincoln signed each increase into law.52 
Rates reached unprecedented heights, which galvanized American indus-
try.53 One repercussion of the confluence between the protective tariff 
and American industrialization was a dramatic increase in the manufac-
turing capacity of the North as it labored to meet growing military needs 
during the American Civil War.54 Protectionist policies were so firmly 
fixed in the U.S. political zeitgeist that premiere academic institutions 
often zealously promoted them. For instance, Philadelphia industrialist 
Joseph Wharton founded the nation’s first business school in 1881. 
Providing his rationale for founding the school, Wharton argued that 
antiprotectionist, global free trade was a “fungus . . . a source of infection 
which healthy political organisms can hardly afford to tolerate.”55 In the 
deed of his gift to the Wharton School of Finance and Economy at the 
University of Pennsylvania, Wharton specified that the school must teach 
“how by craft in commerce one nation may take the substance of a rival 
and maintain for itself [a] virtual monopoly of the most profitable and 
civilizing industries.”56 Furthermore, Wharton made his gift conditional: 
                                                        
 51. 4 ROY P. BASLER, COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 210–15 (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953). 
 52. See Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff, ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S CLASSROOM, http://abraham 
lincolnsclassroom.org/abraham-lincoln-in-depth/abraham-lincoln-and-the-tariff/ (last visited June 1, 
2015). 
 53. GABOR S. BORITT, LINCOLN AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 209 (Gabor 
S. Boritt ed., 1988). 
 54. See Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff, supra note 52. 
 55. ECKES, JR., supra note 2, at 34. 
 56. LIAH GREENFELD, THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM: NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
469 (2001). 
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“[t]he right and duty of national self-protection must be firmly asserted 
and demonstrated” by the school.57 
Despite the free trade ideology accepted as an article of faith58 by 
America’s political establishment over the past fifty years,59 the objective 
of American trade policy has never been the creation of a global free 
market as such. Rather, the objective has been the creation of an integrat-
ed global system that reinforces American economic power60—a goal 
that is as “constant as the northern star.”61 Indeed, since World War II, 
this agenda manifested on both an economic and geopolitical scale.62 The 
U.S. exhibited one of the most important characteristics required of an 
economic hegemon at the end of World War II.63 Namely, it possessed 
the financial dominance that provides a rising power with both the great-
est incentive and the greatest capacity to advance a global trade agenda.64 
As the world’s most productive economy, it was the most likely to bene-
fit from global market penetration.65 As the world’s largest source of 
both supply and demand for capital, it was also the most likely to exploit 
open capital markets.66 With these attributes, American power could be 
used to enfold the economies of a majority of the world’s nations, com-
pel most of the remainder, and isolate the dissenting few.67 It was in this 
context that the Bretton Woods regulatory order was forged. 
                                                        
 57. WILLIAM J. BARBER, ECONOMISTS AND HIGHER LEARNING IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
227 (1993). 
 58. See Renata Salecl, Worries In A Limitless World, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1150 (2005) 
(arguing that “some today are stating that the Market appears as a new God and anyone opposed to 
the dogma of the free market economy is quickly called a heretic”). 
 59. See Lind, supra note 1. 
 60. See generally KLEIN, supra note 8. 
 61. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 1; see also ANDREW 
J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY (2002); 
ANDREW J. BACEVICH, WASHINGTON RULES: AMERICA’S PATH TO PERMANENT WAR (2010); 
CHRISTOPHER LAYNE, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO THE 
PRESENT (2006); JAMES PECK, IDEAL ILLUSIONS: HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CO-OPTED HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2011); Michael Desch, America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overre-
action in U.S. Foreign Policy, 32 INT’L SECURITY 7 (2008). 
 62. See sources cited supra note 61. 
 63. John Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 382 (1982); see also Bruce E. Moon, The United 
States and Globalization: Struggles with Hegemony, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING 
GLOBAL ORDER 431–32 (Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R. D. Underhill eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
 64. Ruggie, supra note 63. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. For a characterization of the free market character of “Anglo-Saxon” capitalism, see 
James Fallows, How the World Works, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1993, at 61–87, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/12/how-the-world-works/305854/; see also infra 
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B. The Rise and Fall of the Bretton Woods Regulatory Order 
In response to the desolation of World War II, the Bretton Woods 
institutions were created to prevent future economic crises by providing 
the regulatory scaffolding necessary to bolster the global economy.68 The 
World Bank was created to make “long-term investments in develop-
ment” to liberate countries from the conditions of poverty, while the IMF 
promoted economic policies calculated to reduce the “financial specula-
tion and market volatility” at the root of economic crises.69 In this new 
paradigm, when a country teeters on economic collapse, the IMF pro-
vides the stabilizing grants and loans necessary to ward it off.70 One of 
the founders of the Bretton Woods institutions, John Maynard Keynes,71 
believed that as long as the institutions adhered to these founding princi-
ples, “the brotherhood of man will have become more than a phrase.”72 
That brotherhood, however, soon proved to be dysfunctional. 
From the beginning, the Bretton Woods institutions did not allocate 
decisionmaking power based upon egalitarian principles such as “one 
country, one vote,” as is the case in the United Nations General Assem-
bly.73 Rather, they allocate power based upon the size of each member 
country’s economy. This places the U.S. at the top of the decisionmaking 
hierarchy. Indeed, the effect of this arrangement provides the U.S. with 
                                                                                                                            
Part I.B. (discussing how the Bretton Woods international order affected the relationship between 
nations). 
 68. Protectionism began to lose its luster in the wake of the Great Depression and World War 
II. American and other Western economists, diplomats, and politicians blamed economic nationalist 
policies, particularly the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 and protectionist measures enacted in re-
sponse in other countries, for creating a trade war at a time when international cooperation was nec-
essary to stave off world-wide financial collapse. Economic nationalism led to militarism and even-
tually war, so the argument went. That argument led to the adoption of a liberal trade policy among 
Western nations first coherently institutionalized under the Bretton Woods institutions, which sought 
to stabilize the international monetary system and promote freer trade. As Harry Dexter White, the 
architect of the Bretton Woods system, put it, “The absence of a high degree of economic collabora-
tion among the leading nations will . . . inevitably result in economic warfare that will be but the 
prelude and instigator of military warfare on an even vaster scale.” See BRUCE JONES ET AL., POWER 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: BUILDING INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN AN ERA OF TRANSNATIONAL THREATS 
234 (2009); KLEIN, supra note 8, at 222–23 (noting that the Bretton Woods institutions were “fi-
nanced through contributions by their initial forty-three member countries, [and] were given the 
explicit mandate to prevent future economic shocks”); see also Lind, supra note 1 and accompany-
ing text; supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 69. See KLEIN, supra note 8. 
 70. Id. at 223–24. 
 71. Id. at 224. 
 72. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Speech by Lord Keynes in Moving to Accept the Final Act at the 
Closing Plenary Session, Bretton Woods, 22 July 1944, in 26 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES 103 (Donald Moggridge ed., 1980). 
 73. See KLEIN, supra note 8, at 223. 
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the singular ability to influence global trade to enhance its economic po-
sition relative to other nations.74 This frame of reference is called “the 
Washington Consensus” (Consensus). 75  The Consensus enabled the 
promulgation of antiprotectionist, global free trade policies that Joseph 
Wharton believed constituted a “fungus”76 that then spread uninhibited 
across the globe. 77  Indeed, the former chief economist of the World 
Bank, and one of the last to fall in line with this antiprotectionist ideolo-
gy, Joseph Stiglitz, argued that “Keynes would be rolling over in his 
grave were he to see what has happened to his child.”78 
For example, each Latin American and African country that ap-
proached the IMF for a major loan was informed that it needed to re-
structure its entire economy.79 Operating under the auspices of trade lib-
eralization, privatization and antiprotectionist trade policies were pack-
aged into the requested loans.80 Given the weaker bargaining position of 
the poorer countries, this practice was highly effective in compelling 
them to accept the policies selected for them by the Consensus.81 In 
country after country, international debt crises were methodically lever-
aged to advance trade liberalization.82  
Strikingly, economists at the Bretton Woods institutions admitted 
during this period that the trade liberalization ideology had nothing to do 
with ending economic crises—all the while claiming that these poorer 
countries freely converted to this ideology, accepting the Consensus as 
                                                        
 74. See KLEIN, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 75. See KLEIN, supra note 8, at 223–25 (noting that what constituted these economic policies 
was considered to be the bare minimum for the economic health of nations, such as the principle that 
“state enterprises should be privatized” and that “barriers impeding the entry of foreign firms should 
be abolished”). The completed list of policies firmly established the principles of “privatization, 
deregulation/free trade, and drastic cuts to government spending.” Id. 
 76. See ECKES, JR., supra note 55; see also KLEIN, supra note 8, at 224–25. Klein characterizes 
these policies as a type of shock therapy to countries seeking debt relief and emergency loans: 
Officials with the World Bank and the IMF had always made policy recom-
mendations when they handed out loans, but in the early eighties, emboldened 
by the desperation of developing countries, those recommendations morphed 
into radical free-market demands. When crisis-struck countries came to the 
IMF seeking debt relief and emergency loans, the fund responded with sweep-
ing shock therapy programs. 
Id. 
 77. KLEIN, supra note 8, at 224–25. 
 78. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13 (2002). 
 79. See KLEIN, supra note 8, at 224–25. 
 80. Id. at 225–26. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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the one true path to economic stability and democracy.83 Indeed, the IMF 
senior economist who designed the trade liberalization policies of Latin 
America and Africa throughout the eighties, Davison Budhoo, later ad-
mitted that “everything we did from 1983 onward was based on our new 
sense of mission to have [poorer countries] ‘privatised’ or die; towards 
this end we ignominiously created economic bedlam in Latin America 
and Africa.”84 Quite often, these policies had the effect of further destabi-
lizing the societies of poorer nations.85 By the turn of the twenty-first 
century, however, the Consensus began to lose its ability to design and 
enforce rules that maintained American economic hegemony.86 Indeed, 
unlike the U.S. that existed after World War II, the U.S. of the twen-
ty-first century no longer found itself as the sole “Great Power,”87 free to 
write the rules of the game to enhance its economic position relative to 
other nations.88 
                                                        
 83. Id. Detailing the differences between the rhetoric and reality of rescuing poor countries 
from economic collapse, Klein summarizes the economists’ acknowledgement of the modus operan-
di of the Bretton Woods institutions: “Here was an acknowledgement, made inside the Washington 
establishment, that developing countries were submitting to them only through a combination of 
false pretenses and bald extortion: Want to save your country? Sell it off.” Id. 
 84. See DAVISON L. BUDHOO, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: DEAR MR. CAMDESSUS—OPEN LETTER 
OF RESIGNATION TO THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 102 
(1990); see also KLEIN, supra note 8, at 226–27 (noting that Dani Rodrik, “a renowned Columbia 
University economist who worked extensively with the World Bank,” explained that these free trade 
policies “had no direct link with creating stability”). 
 85. See KLEIN, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOFFITT, THE WORLD’S MONEY: INTERNATIONAL BANKING FROM 
BRETTON WOODS TO THE BRINK OF INSOLVENCY 13–40 (1983) (describing the rise and fall of the 
Bretton Woods system); see also Peter M. Garber, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Ex-
change Rate System, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 461–63 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993); 
David Hammes & Douglas Wills, Black Gold: The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks 
of the 1970s, 9 INDEP. REV. 501 (2005). 
 87. This is a term of art often used in political science and international relations literature. It 
understands a nation’s strength in material terms by measuring both economic and military strength. 
Nations who have more power relative to other nations are considered superpowers. See Daniel 
Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and International Human 
Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2007) (“Few States have the material power . . . . 
Those states that do—the great powers—are rational, self-interested actors that also enforce interna-
tional law according to their self-interests.”). 
 88. See, e.g., William A. Lovett, Beyond Doha: Multipolar Challenges for a Globalized World, 
17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 3 (2008) (arguing that from the perspective of U.S. trade policy, the 
United States is moving from an era defined by its being the world’s preeminent economic power to 
an era marked by a multipolar distribution of economic power). 
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C. The Chinese Challenge 
After spending nearly two centuries as a minor actor on the world 
stage, China is now emerging as one of the world’s Great Powers. For-
mer U.S. Ambassador to China, Charles W. Freeman, notes that China 
believes, with some justification, that for most of its history it was 
the largest, wealthiest, best governed, and technologically most ad-
vanced society on the planet. China brims with confidence that it 
can regain this status, which it considers the natural order of affairs, 
and that it will do so in this century.89 
Over the next few decades, China’s reemergence as the Pacific 
Rim’s regional hegemon represents the primary geopolitical challenge to 
U.S. interests in the region.90 Should China’s geopolitical influence con-
tinue to grow during this period, the world will witness 
the largest shift in the global distribution of power since the rise of 
the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. If China 
in the next 10 to 15 years surpasses the United States as the world’s 
largest economy, it will mark the first time in centuries that the 
world’s economic leader will be non-English speaking, non-
Western, and non-democratic.91 
Many Chinese elites believe that by 2021, China will surpass the 
U.S. as the world’s largest economy.92 If efficiently managed, this new-
found economic power will shape the region’s geopolitics in China’s 
favor. China’s paramount leader, President Xi Jinping, openly advocates 
for the realization of a “Chinese dream” that culminates in “the great re-
juvenation of the Chinese nation.”93 The Chinese dream is that by 2049, 
China will restore itself as the regional hegemon.94  
In his March 2014 press briefing, China’s Foreign Minister, Wang 
Yi, described “mutual respect” between the U.S. and China as the found-
ing principle of the new era in Great Power politics. Yi, however, defines 
the phrase, “mutual respect,” as deference to “each other’s sovereignty 
                                                        
 89. Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Jr., China’s Challenge to American Hegemony: Re-
marks to the Global Strategy Forum (Jan. 20, 2010) (discussing the relative rise and fall of Chinese 
and U.S. hegemony). 
 90. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 91. Id. at 1. 
 92. Id. at 2. 
 93. See Gracie, supra note 23 (detailing President Xi Jinping’s remarks at an October 2014 top 
level Communist Party meeting in Beijing at which he set out his vision for Chinese governance); 
see also Zhao Yinan, ‘Chinese Dream’ is Xi’s Vision, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.chi 
nadaily.com.cn/ china/2013npc/2013-03/18/content_16315025.htm. 
 94. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 18. 
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and territorial integrity, social system and development path, and core 
interests and concerns,” making no reference to the U.S.’s strategic inter-
ests in the region concerning adherence to the international rule of law, 
customs, and norms.95 President Xi and the Communist Party are inching 
ever closer to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream.96 This vision 
was stated boldly in May 2014 when President Xi delivered a speech on 
Asian security.97 In this speech, Xi states, “It is for the people of Asia to 
run the affairs of Asia . . . and uphold the security of Asia.”98 Former 
U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense Henry Kissinger notes 
that China is not accustomed to an egalitarian system of equal states, ar-
guing, “[Historically], China considered itself, in a sense, the sole sover-
eign government of the world. . . . Diplomacy was not a bargaining pro-
cess between multiple sovereign interests but a series of carefully con-
trived ceremonies in which foreign societies were given the opportunity 
to affirm their assigned place in the global hierarchy.”99 
Today, China’s rising economic and geopolitical power also comes 
in the form of newly created multilateral institutions, which mirror the 
Bretton Woods institutions, but where China sits as the chief member. In 
July 2014, China signed an agreement with Brazil, Russia, India, and 
South Africa to create the New Development Bank (NDB) which, like 
                                                        
 95. For instance, in 2010, China’s exponentially increasing military budget and naval moderni-
zation aroused fears among its ASEAN neighbors, especially in view of the territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea. Concern about China’s military ambitions led neighboring ASEAN countries, 
particularly Vietnam, to try to “internationalize” the dispute. Comments by then-U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton in 2010 indicating that “the United States would be willing to facilitate multi-
lateral talks on the issue,” elicited a furious response from Beijing, charging that the United States 
was interfering in the issue. MELISSA MURPHY & WEN JIN YUAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES, REGIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE 
CONCERNED? (May 14, 2012), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/101129_Yuan_Regional 
Coop_WEB.pdf; see also Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. 
OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ 
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all economic activity in East Asia and has become the world’s largest merchandise trader. The coun-
try is expected to contribute the single largest share of any country to global and regional growth in 
2014, and it is forecast that more than US$1 trillion of Chinese FDI will flow abroad by 2020, much 
of it to China’s periphery.”); Yinan, supra note 93; see also Denny Roy, More Security for Rising 
China, Less for Others, ASIAPACIFIC ISSUES, Jan. 2013,  available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ 
system/tdf/private/api106.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=33843. 
 97. The speech was delivered at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures. See Xi Jinping Presides Over the Summit and Delivers Important Speech, 
CICA-CHINA.ORG, http://www.cica-china.org/eng/yxxw_1/t1170126.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 
2015). 
 98. See President Xi Jinping, Remarks at the CICA Shanghai Summit (May 21, 2014), availa-
ble at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-06/03/content_32561159_2.htm. 
 99. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER 213–14 (2014). 
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the Bretton Woods institutions, will provide loans and liquidity to its 
member nations.100 Three months later, China inaugurated the Asian In-
frastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which now includes over forty na-
tions.101 The U.S. views the AIIB as a deliberate attempt to undermine 
both the Asian Development Bank (ADB),102 whose decisions are steered 
by the U.S.,103 and the World Bank.104 There is little doubt that the crea-
tion of these new institutions reflects China’s growing power, disdain for 
the Bretton Woods international order,105 and its will to use its increasing 
influence for both economic and geopolitical purposes.106 The U.S. views 
these institutions as political levers that allow China to pull its neighbors 
within its geopolitical and economic sphere of influence while defying 
Western world order ideas, institutions, and rules of the game.107 
                                                        
 100. The NDB headquarters is located in Shanghai and operates much like the World Bank. 
The NDB has $50 billion in initial capital, mostly financed by China, through which it will finance 
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 101. Jackie Northam, Dozens of Countries Join China-Backed Bank Opposed by Washington, 
NPR (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/03/31/396604082/dozens-of-
countries-join-china-backed-bank-opposed-by-washington. 
 102. Like the World Bank and IMF, the ADB was created after World War II to establish the 
global financial order. Notably, China has pledged one hundred billion dollars in initial capital. See 
Perlez, supra note 6. 
 103. See generally Mona M. Lyne et al., Controlling Coalitions: Social Lending at the Multi-
lateral Development Banks, 4 REV. INT’L ORG 407 (2009); Christopher Kilby, Donor Influence in 
Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Development Bank, 1 REV. INT’L ORG. 173 
(2006); see also supra Part I.B. 
 104. See sources cited supra note 104; see also supra Part I.B. 
 105. See Perlez, supra note 6 (discussing the major motivation for China’s initiatives in creat-
ing parallel institutions to the Bretton Woods international order). 
 106. China is willing to put up substantial amounts of money to fuel its efforts to increase its 
geopolitical influence in all organizations that help shape international discourse on the economic 
rules of the game. “China is doing it to increase its say; it’s playing the part of investor in many 
international organizations in the hope of being able to formulate things, even rewrite the rules of the 
game” See Didi Kirsten Tatlow, BRIC, BRICS or BRICSI? The Growing Challenge, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB. RENDEZVOUS BLOG (Mar. 31, 2013 1:43 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013 /03/ 
28/first-bric-then-brics-now-bricsi-the-world-financial-orders-challenge/; see also JOHNSON ET AL., 
supra note 26. 
 107. See Perlez, supra note 6. For example, Perlez notes that the U.S. concluded the AIIB will 
“fail to meet environmental standards, procurement requirements and other safeguards adopted by 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, including protections intended to prevent the 
forced removal of vulnerable populations from their lands.” Id. 
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II. REALPOLITIK AND THE RISE OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
A. The Zero-Sum Game of FTAs 
Given the discrediting of the Bretton Woods international order and 
the trade liberalization policies that it enforces,108 countries are now pull-
ing away from this flawed system and towards a system of FTAs.109 No-
tably, these new FTAs contain the very type of protectionist trade poli-
cies that galvanized the rise of U.S. hegemony.110 FTAs are evolving into 
an increasingly critical platform for writing the rules of the game, and 
they are increasingly viewed as key instruments in establishing diplomat-
ic relationships.111 FTAs have so permeated the conduct of international 
                                                        
 108. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 109. See William P. Kratzke & Dmitri Titoff, Russia and the WTO: Realpolitik by the Rules of 
Free Trade, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 633, 641 (2014) (noting the growing force of FTAs, which began to 
proliferate in the late twentieth century); see also LIZ BROWNSELL, ADVOCATES FOR INT’L DEV., 
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 6 (2012), available at 
http://a4id.org/sites/default/files/user/Bilateral%20and%20Regional%20Trade%20Agreements.pdf. 
Brownsell argues:  
The increase in the number of bilateral and regional trade agreements in recent 
years has occurred despite the existence of the WTO and the [Bretton Woods 
international order]. One explanation for this is that the WTO has become in-
creasingly slow and comparatively ineffective as a means of establishing a 
system of free trade between countries. 
Id.; Edward T. Hayes, Department Recent Development ADR to Taxation, LA. B.J., Dec. 2014-Jan. 
2015, at 323, 323, available at 62 LA. B.J. 323 (Westlaw). Hayes discusses the fragile current status 
of the WTO, a cousin to the Bretton Woods international order, and its effects on the development of 
FTAs: 
The [WTO] entered full crisis mode after its Members failed to adopt the Pro-
tocol of Amendment to add the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to the 
WTO Agreements.  
. . .  The failure to adopt the TFA is widely seen as fatal to the long-suffering 
Doha Development Agenda, which was launched in 2001. Since that time, the 
Members have completely failed to achieve any progress on the Doha is-
sues. . . . The damage is now done and the WTO’s role as a negotiating forum 
could be over as WTO members will continue to move away from multilateral 
trade negotiation to . . . bilateral and regional [FTAs]. 
Id.; Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region 
_e/region_e.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) (noting the rise of FTAs to set the rules of global trade); 
see discussion supra Part I.A. 
 110. See generally Anne O. Krueger, Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules 
of Origin (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4352, 1993), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4352.pdf (arguing that there is a protectionist bias inherent in FTAs). 
FTAs lowers tariffs between signatory countries, though allows for tariffs on non-signatory coun-
tries. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2005) (evolution of trade agreements from essentially political to more regulatory); see also Ste-
phen Joseph Powell & Ludmila Mendonça Lopes Ribeiro, Managing the Rule of Law in the Ameri-
cas: An Empirical Portrait of the Effects of 15 Years of WTO, Mercosul, and NAFTA Dispute Reso-
 
126 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:107 
business that Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University refers to their 
amalgamation as a “spaghetti bowl”112 of FTAs. Today, there are over 
six hundred regional and bilateral trade agreements worldwide that con-
stitute a “maze of free-trade areas.”113 For the U.S., FTAs represent both 
an opportunity to geopolitically hedge against the disintegration of the 
Bretton Woods regulatory order and to repair the frayed diplomatic rela-
tionships that often lie in the wake of the trade liberalization policies that 
it promulgated. For those poorer nations whose economic crises were 
related to the requirements of the Consensus, FTAs prove to be a far 
more sound economic policy than blind reliance on a trade liberalization 
ideology. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),114 for 
example, represents this trend. It erodes the trade liberalization ideology 
that lies at the heart of the Bretton Woods regulatory order.115 
                                                                                                                            
lution on Civil Society in Latin America, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 198 (2011) (trade 
dispute settlement contributes to the management and perfection of the rule of law in support of 
democratic governance for civil societies in Latin America). See generally Patrick Specht, The Dis-
pute Settlement Systems of WTO and NAFTA—Analysis and Comparison, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 57 (1998). 
 112. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation Free Trade Areas, in THE 
DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1–2 (1995). 
 113. Paul Sarlo, The Spagetti Bowl Revisited in the Context of Corruption: Understanding How 
Corrupt Counties Could Subvert the WTO’s Rule-Oriented System Through Preferential Trade 
Agreements, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2014). See generally MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1st ed. 2013). 
 114. NAFTA is one of the most well-known free trade zones, with parties to the agreement 
being Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFFICE OF 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-
american-free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). By way of example, if Canada 
desired to import goods from the United States, those goods would be imported tariff free as long as 
they meet NAFTA origin requirements. To be eligible for tariff-free treatment under NAFTA, goods 
must originate in a NAFTA country. This scheme prevents NAFTA signatories from importing 
goods from non-NAFTA countries, then trading those goods within the free trade zone without the 
signatories being able to assess tariffs on those goods. Id. 
 115. Id.; see also BROWNSELL, supra note 109, at 10. Brownsell notes: 
It seems clear that NAFTA has played an important role in increasing trade 
between its member countries. However, an important question in relation to 
world trade is whether this increase is a global one or whether the increase ac-
tually represents trade diversion (i.e. diversion of trade away from non-
member countries, rather than a genuine increase in trade). NAFTA contains 
restrictive rules of origin, which are very protectionist in nature . . . . 
Id.; JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
CHALLENGES 23 (2005) (arguing that “in a few industries, most notably textiles and apparel where 
‘yarn forward’ rules of origin were imposed specifically to make US textile firms the preferred sup-
pliers for Mexican apparel manufacturers, NAFTA has indeed fostered trade diversion”); John C. 
Thomure, Jr., The Uneasy Case for The North American Free Trade Agreement, 21 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 181 (1995) (noting that NAFTA is likely to hinder the global free trade agenda); 
see also discussion infra Part I.B. 
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For the United States, NAFTA represents an economic opportunity 
to capitalize on a growing export market to the south and a geopolitical 
opportunity to repair a Mexican relationship frayed by the Consensus.116 
The agreement opens doors for U.S. exporters who faced Mexican indus-
trial tariffs five times higher on average than U.S. tariffs.117 In 2010, the 
United States reported $918 billion in trade with Canada and Mexico.118 
As for job growth, the director at the Center for North American Studies 
at American University, Robert Pastor, argues that despite grim predic-
tions, the largest job growth in the U.S. occurred after NAFTA was 
signed. He argues, “The period of greatest growth in trade among the 
N[AFTA] countries coincided with the period of the largest growth in 
employment, of jobs in the United States, 23 or 24 million jobs.”119 For 
Mexico, NAFTA represents an exit from the calamitous debt crisis of the 
1980s.120 NAFTA provides Mexican exporters with additional market 
access and helps to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). At the end of 
1999, Mexico was the eighth largest export economy in the world and, 
by the end of 2000, became the fifth largest export economy in the 
world. During the nineties, Mexico’s exports to the United States rose 
160 percent.121 Despite the results, however, there are many who still 
oppose the signing of NAFTA.122  
Criticism of FTAs notwithstanding,123 the recalibration of global 
trade rules that they represent is a manifestation of geopolitical realities 
that dwarf such critiques.124 Currently, the realpolitik concern for the 
U.S. is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream in the Pacific Rim.125 
                                                        
 116. See SCHOTT & HUFBAUER, supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Julián Aguilar, Twenty Years Later, NAFTA Remains a Source of Tension, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/us/twenty-years-later-nafta-remains-a-
source-of-tension.html. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See BROWNSELL, supra note 109. 
 121. See Treaties - Post–World War II Collective Trade Agreements, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW 
AM. NATION, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Treaties-Post-world-war-ii-collective-
trade-agreements.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 122. See Aguilar, supra note 118. Aguilar notes that “critics of NAFTA say it has resulted in a 
loss of United States manufacturing and shipping jobs and in less production oversight. They say 
N[AFTA] has also displaced Mexican agricultural workers into other sectors or forced them to im-
migrate illegally to the United States.” Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Kratzke & Titoff, supra note 109, at 643 (arguing that “trade policy is a function of 
political pressures, not calculations of consumer welfare, as some might believe”). 
 125. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 18–19 (discussing the geopolitical ambitions of 
China); see also Gracie, supra note 23. 
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In this geopolitical reality, China also pursues its great rejuvenation 
through a web of FTAs in the Pacific Rim.126 These agreements recali-
brate the framework of regional trade in a way that improves China’s 
position relative to other nations.127   Speaking at the Third ASEAN+3128 
Informal Summit in November 1999, then-Chinese Vice Premier, Zhu 
Rongji, proclaimed, “China cannot develop without East Asia, neither 
can East Asia prosper without China. As a member of East Asia, China 
attaches great importance to increased cooperation with other countries 
in East Asia.”129  Consistent with this vision, Zhu proposed a China-
ASEAN FTA, the first such agreement between ASEAN and an outside 
partner.130 Critical to the successful operationalization of the FTA was an 
“early harvest” provision, whereby China agreed to unilaterally reduce 
tariffs in a number of key areas five years before the agreement was to 
fully take effect, and a decade before the members had to end their tariffs 
for Chinese imports. 131  It is the hope of ASEAN members that an 
ASEAN-centric regional architecture will socialize China into norms of 
regional dispute resolution, rulemaking, and legal compliance. 132 
ASEAN members, however, now recognize that China, like the United 
States at a similar stage of economic development,133 uses its size to 
dominate its regional relationships through regional structures that China 
dominates.134 
                                                        
 126. See FUJITSU RESEARCH INST., supra note 7. 
 127. Such agreements also provide for FDI opportunities. See Larry Catá Backer, Michael 
Komesaroff on Chinese Investments in Afghanistan and the Changing Face of Global Mining, LAW 
AT END OF DAY (Mar. 17, 2013), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/michael-komesaroff-on-
chinese.html. 
 128. ASEAN+3 constitutes the addition of three member states to ASEAN10: China, Japan, 
and South Korea. See ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation, ASS’N OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS, 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation-2 (last visited June 13, 2015). 
 129. Premier Zhu Rongji of the People’s Republic of China, Address at the Third ASEAN+3 
Informal Summit (Nov. 28, 1999), available at http://www.asean.org/news/item/address-by-premier-
zhu-rongji-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china-at-the-third-asean3-informal-summit-28-november-
1999. 
 130 . The initial framework agreement of this agreement was signed in November 2002. 
ASEAN SECRETARIAT, ASEAN’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2013), available at 
http://www.jterc.or.jp/koku/koku_semina/pdf/130306_presentation01.pdf. 
 131. The “early harvest” proposal included tariff reductions on 600 key agricultural products 
that went into effect in 2005. See ASEAN, FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON COMPREHENSIVE 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS AND THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2002), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ 
aseanchinafta.pdf. 
 132. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 42. 
 133. See discussion supra Part I.A.; discussion supra Part I.B. 
 134. See discussion supra Part I.C. (detailing China’s creation of institutions parallel to those 
of the Bretton Woods institutions, which are primarily used to extend China’s reach in the region). 
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Southeast Asian nations also see that China has no intention of sup-
porting a strong and integrated ASEAN, as is envisioned in the group’s 
charter.135 China acts consistently to divide ASEAN members by press-
ing its territorial claims in the South China Sea, which borders several 
nations.136 This dynamic was in play at the 2012 ASEAN ministerial 
meeting in Phnom Penh. For the first time, ASEAN failed to issue a joint 
communiqué due to Chinese pressure preventing any mention of the 
South China Sea in the document, over the wishes of the other ASEAN 
members.137  
China’s neighbors also have long-standing concerns that what Chi-
na touts as mutually beneficial development projects actually result in the 
exporting of China’s domestic problems, including a lack of rule of law, 
environmental degradation, food and water security, and a poor record on 
human rights.138 The growing narrative in the region is that China also 
conceives mutually-beneficial development projects to be those that pri-
marily benefit China. This narrative continues to grow, as the majority of 
investment projects employ mostly Chinese workers rather than local 
labor, and the structure of trade, whereby China primarily imports com-
modities from less-developed nations, has given rise to accusations of 
neocolonialist behavior—a behavior also attributed to the U.S.139 
The majority of nations in the Pacific Rim are committed to inter-
national law, global trade rules, and norms of the twenty-first century. 
Like the United States, they are determined not to have their national 
interests compromised by any Great Power, and are anxious that China’s 
long-term strategy is to use its geopolitical power to persuade neighbor-
ing countries to yield to its interests.140 The apprehension of China’s 
neighbors presents a highly favorable environment for the United States 
to pursue its vital regional security interests. It is a matter of situational 
irony that China’s neighbors are now turning to the United States to 
                                                        
 135. The ASEAN charter declares one of the organization’s main goals is “to enhance regional 
resilience by promoting greater political, security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation.” 
ASEAN Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2, available at http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-
Charter.pdf. 
 136. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 42. 
 137. Ernest Z. Bower, China Reveals its Hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh, SOUTHEAST ASIA 
FROM CORNER OF 18TH & K STREETS, July 19, 2012, at 1, available at http://csis.org/publication/ 
china-reveals-its-hand-asean-phnom-penh. 
 138. See Jeffrey Reeves, China’s Unraveling Engagement Strategy, 36 WASH. Q. 139, 141–42 
(2013), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_Reeves.pdf. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See generally JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 26. 
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counterbalance China’s growing hegemony.141 It is within this context 
that U.S. engagement in the TPP is best understood. 
B. American Realpolitik and the TPP 
As China challenges both its neighbors’ and the U.S.’s vital inter-
ests in the region,142 the U.S. and other Pacific Rim nations are attempt-
ing to forge a counterweight to China. The TPP represents a significant 
tool for the U.S. to both counteract China’s growing hegemony and re-
main a credible ally to China’s neighbors.143 It is an unprecedented FTA 
that will have lasting geopolitical implications for the Pacific Rim. It re-
flects both a convergence of economies seeking to form a broader alli-
ance independent of China, and a divergence from the multilateral trad-
ing system represented by the Bretton Woods international order.  
For the United States, the TPP is also key in maintaining important 
military security measures that are critical to U.S. interests in the region. 
Post-World War II, the Pacific Rim served as a strategic anchor for vital 
U.S. security interests, first in containing the Soviet Union144 and now 
counteracting the rise of China.145 This informs the Obama Administra-
                                                        
 141. According to Joseph S. Nye, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, China’s growing 
economic and military might has frightened its neighbors into looking for allies to balance China’s 
increase in hard power. Joseph S. Nye Jr., China’s Soft Power Deficit, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842. 
 142. Id.; see also DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33653, EAST ASIAN REGIONAL 
ARCHITECTURE: NEW ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND U.S. POLICY 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf. 
 143. See Roger C. Altman & Richard N. Haass, Why the Trans-Pacific Partnership Matters, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/opinion/why-the-trans-pacific-
partnership-matters.html. Discussing the motivation of the Asian nations for U.S. participation in the 
TPP, the authors argue: 
In Asia and the Pacific, parties to the deal—not only our allies Japan and Aus-
tralia, but also Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia—see the trade accord as a 
way of counterbalancing China’s economic might. This is why trade is central 
to our foreign policy; without this deal, the so-called pivot to Asia will be hol-
low. 
Id. 
 144. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 5. 
 145. See Michael Vincent, US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter Hails Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship as Underscoring ‘Our Lasting Commitment to Asia–Pacific’, ABC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2015), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-07/us-defence-secretary-backs-trans-pacific-partnership/ 
6375274. Carter noted that the Pacific Rim is a “defining region” for the U.S.’s vital interests, stating 
“[Y]ou might not expect to hear this from a secretary of defense, but in terms of the rebalance in its 
broader sense, TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier. . . . It would deepen our alliances 
and partnerships abroad and underscore our lasting commitment to the Asia–Pacific.” Id. Noting that 
this region will be home to “an expected 3.2 billion middle-class consumers by 2030,” Carter argued 
that the U.S. cannot afford the mistake of “taking security for granted.” Id. 
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tion’s “pivot to Asia,” 146  which clearly demonstrates that the United 
States considers China’s growing hegemony as its foremost geopolitical 
challenge. In the realpolitik context, the TPP is a critical element in this 
pivot to the Chinese sphere of influence.147 
The United States has three major objectives with the TPP: (1) 
counterbalancing the rise of Chinese hegemony; (2) strengthening old 
alliances and building new ones;148 and (3) reforming the economic ar-
chitecture of the region in a way that ensures adherence to international 
law, customs, and norms.149 Despite the emphasis the idea was given by 
the Obama Administration,150 the United States’ primary objective with 
the TPP is not to establish a free trade zone.151 Of the TPP’s potential 
members, the United States already has FTAs with Mexico, Canada, 
Australia, Chile, South Korea, Singapore, and Peru.152 By this calculus, 
the United States could only form new connections with Vietnam, Ma-
laysia, Japan, New Zealand, and Brunei. While the rationale for market 
                                                        
 146. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17 and accompanying text; MANYIN ET AL., supra 
note 11 and accompanying text; Altman & Haass, supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 147. See sources cited supra note 146. 
 148. See Nye, supra note 141 and supporting text. 
 149. Nadia Gire, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Revival in United States Trade 
Policy Reform, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Summer 2012, at 60, 61–64, available at 20-SUM 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 60 (Westlaw); see also Solis, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
Solis also notes that the WTO “has been unable to update the multilateral rules on trade and invest-
ment for the past 20 years,” and argues that the TPP is a critical vehicle to “make the rules in inter-
national trade” that matches the realities of the twenty-first century, and that the U.S. will lose the 
ability to do so if it is not a member of the TPP. Solis, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 150. See President Barack Obama, 2014 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state- 
union-address (emphasizing free trade as the primary focus of the TPP). 
 151. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in 
Sheep’s Clothing, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 28–29, 51–52 (2011). Noting the economic 
interests of the U.S. in the TPP, Kolsky Lewis argues: 
Nevertheless, the reasons go beyond the longterm economic potential of a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific; the reasons also include a significant ge-
opolitical component. In particular, the United States has the potential to alter 
some of the economic power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, which is consistent 
with President Obama’s stated goals of increased U.S. engagement in the re-
gion. 
Id. at 37. 
 152. See Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://www.trade.gov/fta (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2015). Indeed, among the twelve countries currently negotiating the TPP, there are so many 
existing free trade agreements that there are only eight bilateral combinations that are not already 
covered by existing preferential arrangements: Australia—Peru; Brunei—U.S.; Brunei—Peru; 
Chile—Vietnam; New Zealand—Peru; New Zealand—U.S.; Peru—Vietnam; and Vietnam—U.S. 
See also John Ravenhill, Extending the TPP: The Political Economy of Multilateralization in Asia, at 
14 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia & the Pacific, Conference Paper Presentation, 
Asia-Pacific Trade Economists’ Conference, 2009), available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/ 
mtg/2-3John%20Ravenhill.pdf. 
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access to Vietnam would appear to fit the mold of U.S. corporate inter-
ests, Vietnam joined the talks only after the United States signaled its 
interest. Given this, Vietnam is not driving the U.S.’s involvement.153 
Indeed, Vietnam’s true motivation is to establish a geopolitical alliance 
with the U.S. as a counterbalance to China’s growing hegemony in the 
region.154  
These geopolitical calculations are not limited to Vietnam. On 
March 15, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe announced that 
Japan would join the TPP. Noting the United States and Japanese alli-
ance as critical in this effort,155 he argued that the TPP is “Japan’s last 
chance to remain an economic power in Asia and shape the region’s fu-
ture. . . . ‘If Japan alone continues to look inward, we will have no hope 
for growth. This is our last chance. If we don’t seize it, Japan will be left 
out.’”156 Like the United States, Japanese interests in the TPP are both 
economic and geopolitical: 
[Japan] sees a leadership role in the [TPP] as a way to return to cen-
ter stage after being eclipsed in the region by the rise of China, 
which many in Tokyo view as jeopardizing Japan’s economic inter-
ests and security. China . . . is pursuing its own bilateral and multi-
lateral trade agreements in the region. . . . That has, in effect, made 
the [TPP] a vehicle of sorts for the United States, and now Japan, to 
counter China’s influence.157 
                                                        
 153. See generally Vietnam, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2015); Vietnam, OFFICE OF U. S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ 
countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/vietnam (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (reporting that Vietnam 
has a relatively large population of approximately 86 million, and yet it is only the U.S.’s 45th larg-
est goods market as of 2009). Entering a free trade agreement that includes Vietnam as a partner 
would also cause some consternation within the United States-Vietnamese shrimp and catfish ex-
ports that have been the subject of antidumping investigations and associated litigation within the 
United States, resulting in the imposition of duties on these products. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A 
Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 315 (2005); Stephanie Showalter, 
The United States and Rising Shrimp Imports from Asia and Central America: An Economic or 
Environmental Issue?, 29 VT. L. REV. 847 (2005); Joshua Startup, From Catfish to Shrimp: How 
Vietnam Learned to Navigate the Waters of “Free Trade” as a Non-Market Economy, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1963 (2005). The U.S. industries that filed these petitions are unlikely to be pleased by the 
prospect of Vietnam’s products obtaining improved market access to the United States in the form of 
reduced—and perhaps ultimately removed—tariffs. See Cho, supra, at 315–17. 
 154 . See, e.g., JAMES BELLACQUA, CNA CHINA STUDIES, THE CHINA FACTOR IN U.S.-
VIETNAM RELATIONS (2012); John Roberts, The U.S.-Vietnam Alliance Against China, AXIS OF 
LOGIC (July 30, 2013), http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_65866.shtml. 
 155. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Moves to Enter Talks on Pacific Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/japan-aims-to-join-trans-pacific-partnership-
talks.html. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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Also in this vein, former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, cau-
tioned that without U.S engagement in Asia, China will be the sole re-
gional hegemon, leaving the United States and much of Asia in the 
“dust.”158 
The TPP, as currently envisioned, excludes China. William Craft, 
deputy assistant secretary of state for trade policy and programs in the 
State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, notes that 
“we’re certainly not doing this as an anti-Chinese thing . . . we can fore-
see them joining it.”159 However, Craft also notes that this is only possi-
ble in a subsequent version of the agreement.160 The realpolitik transla-
tion of this position is that China is barred from joining the TPP until the 
agreement’s ground rules are firmly established, which is to say that con-
straining China’s economic hegemony is the primary objective of the 
TPP. This approach is not lost on China.161  Indeed, there is a sense 
among Chinese academic and policy circles that “the main reason behind 
the Obama Administration’s support for the TPP agenda is the US’s de-
sire to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain China’s rise.”162 
Similar reports published in the People’s Daily, the official news organ 
of the Chinese Communist Party, refer to TPP as “superficially an eco-
nomic agreement but contain[ing] an obvious political purpose to con-
strain China’s rise.”163 According to Chinese scholars, the TPP will result 
in a tariff scheme disadvantageous to China.164 Official Chinese online 
media is clear as to what it perceives as the U.S.’s strategic interests in 
the region: 
                                                        
 158. Interview by Steve Weisman with C. Fred Bergsten, coauthor of China’s Rise: Challenges 
and Opportunities (Nov. 16, 2009), available at http://www.piie.com/publications/interviews/ 
pp20091116bergsten.pdf (discussing emergence of a China-led, Asian-only trading bloc). 
 159. See Everett Rosenfeld, Major Asia-Pacific Trade Pact Enters Final Stages, CNBC (Mar. 
20, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102517056. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Larry Catá Backer, Encircling China or Embedding It, LAW AT END OF DAY (Nov. 8, 
2010), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/encircling-china.html. For a considerable period of 
time, Chinese officials have been focusing on the possibility that the United States intends to sur-
round it to prevent it from more forcefully asserting its own interests in the region. Echoing similar 
concerns of the Russians, the Chinese suggest that American policy has been to engage China eco-
nomically while creating an effective military encirclement that would enhance the American posi-
tion in the event of conflict. Id. 
 162 . WEN JIN YUAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP AND CHINA’S CORRESPONDING STRATEGIES 1 (2012), available at http://csis.org/files/ 
publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf. 
 163. Id. at 2 (quoting Ding Gang & Ji Peijuan, Mei Licu Fan Taipingyang Huoban Guanxi 
[The US Attaches Great Importance to the Pan-Pacific Partnership], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S 
DAILY] (July 27, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-07/27/c_121725596.htm). 
 164. Id. at 5. 
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On a strategic level, Washington wants Southeast Asia to 
form the center of an “Asian strategic alliance” that in-
cludes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and India. On a po-
litical level, the US continues to export “democracy” and 
Western values to Southeast Asian countries. On the eco-
nomic level, the US has close ties with Southeast Asia in 
terms of trade, finance and investment and considers the 
latter an important overseas market, resource supplier and 
investment destination. At a military and security level, the 
US wants to set up more military bases and positively inter-
fere in security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.165 
Given the zero-sum game of writing the rules of global trade, China 
is redoubling its efforts in pursuing its own trade agenda that counters the 
perceived economic and geopolitical effects of the TPP.166 A March 21, 
2013, report notes, 
[f]ollowing Japan’s recent announcement that it will join in negotia-
tions of the US-led [TPP] the US and China are picking up the pace 
in staking their claims on Asian economic territory. The US is en-
couraging South Korea to join in the TPP, which has pressured Chi-
na into spurring discussions of a trilateral [FTA] between China, Ja-
pan, and South Korea.167 
In the realpolitik context, it is critical for the United States and its 
allies to have a unified strategy for responding to the rise of Chinese he-
gemony. A lack of cohesion among the stakeholders’ responses to Chi-
                                                        
 165. Li Bing, Time to Counter US Ploys, XINHUANET (July 29, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet. 
com/english2010/indepth/2010-07/29/c_13420374.htm. 
 166. See WEN JIN YUAN, supra note 162, at 6 (noting China’s response to the U.S.’s TPP strat-
egy is developing its own web of FTAs in the Pacific Rim—and that this response is China’s “un-
swerving policy”); see also Larry Catá Backer, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the 
U.S., and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 49, 77–78 (2014). Backer argues: 
More importantly, China will accelerate the creation of its own enhanced free 
trade area, one in which it will play the dominant role. China is “also putting 
work into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia 
(CEPEA), which would include not only China, Japan, and South Korea but 
also the ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), along with India, Australia, and New Zealand.” 
Id. at 77. 
 167 . Park Hyun et al., US Hoping South Korea Will Join Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
HANKYOREH (Mar. 21, 2013), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international 
/579052.html. At a Korea Society lecture in New York on March 19, Assistant U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative for Korea, Japan and APEC Affairs Wendy Cutler said, “We believe that Korea could be a 
natural member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. We look forward to continuing our 
working relationship with Korea and keeping them updated. . . . In response, China is pulling out all 
the stops in pursuit of the China-Japan-South Korea FTA.” Id. 
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na’s growing power will damage any effort to integrate China into a 
rules-based regulatory system.168 However, as discussed in the next Part, 
the Obama Administration’s uncompromising enforcement of the FCPA 
threatens to undermine the success of the TPP by disincentivizing U.S. 
companies from investing in the region. 
III. RECONCILING FCPA ENFORCEMENT WITH THE TPP 
A. FCPA Enforcement Undermines the TPP 
The FCPA is widely regarded as among the most important and 
burdensome statutes in international business, with fines routinely reach-
ing in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.169 The policy objective 
of the FCPA is to deter bribery in a manner that aids the United States in 
building international economic and diplomatic alliances in developing 
countries170—the same alliances that lie at the heart of a successfully op-
erationalized TPP.171 The vague language and strict enforcement of the 
FCPA, however, conspire to disincentivize business from entering the 
markets of those countries perceived by the United States as more cor-
rupt,172 thereby undercutting the geopolitical objectives of the TPP. 
The FCPA prohibits U.S. citizens, companies, and their employees 
from (1) giving “anything of value” to foreign officials “in order to assist 
[the payor] in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to, any person” and (2) failing to keep records and books 
“which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions 
                                                        
 168. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 1. The TPP serves several strategic goals. 
Namely, “[i]t is a manifestation of the Obama Administration’s ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific and if 
concluded, may serve to shape the economic architecture of the region . . . and has the potential 
to . . . establish regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy.” Id. 
 169 . TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK, DETERRING AND PUNISHING CORPORATE BRIBERY: AN 
EVALUATION OF UK CORPORATE PLEA AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL RECOVERY IN OVERSEAS BRIBERY 
CASES 32, 74 (2012). 
 170. See Spalding, supra note 28, at 357–58. 
 171. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 172. One researcher found that higher initial corruption levels were significantly associated 
with a higher frequency of FCPA enforcement actions even after controlling for other relevant varia-
bles. Nicholas M. McLean, Note, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 
1970, 1974–75 (2012). Similarly, there is evidence that greater FCPA sanctions are imposed in 
countries where citizens have worse perceptions of their government’s anti-bribery institutions. 
Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs And Enforcement Of The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, 3–4, 23, 63 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 12-35, 2012) (using the World Bank’s scores for government effectiveness and rule of 
law to measure the strength of local anti-bribery institutions). Choi and Davis’s results also show 
that firms operating in lower-income countries tend to incur greater FCPA penalties. Id. at 24, 52 
tbl.5; see also Trying to Pull Together, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/18586448. 
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and dispositions of the assets of the [company].”173  A “foreign official” 
is defined as 
[a]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international 
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on 
behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instru-
mentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organ-
ization.174 
While “department” and “agency” are somewhat straightforward, 
the FCPA does not define “instrumentality.” U.S. officials have long ad-
vanced the position that an SOE might constitute an instrumentality un-
der the statute, though courts refuse to adopt a bright-line rule to define 
instrumentality.175 This is particularly troublesome for U.S. businesses 
because of the SOE’s dominance in many of the TPP-negotiating mem-
bers’ economies.176 Additionally, U.S. officials define “foreign official” 
broadly enough to include doctors employed by state-owned hospitals 
that may fall under the definition of an SOE instrumentality.177 The stat-
ute also does not define “anything of value,” but has been interpreted to 
include not only cash payments, but also gifts, meals, drinks, and enter-
tainment; there is no de minimis value associated with this element that 
                                                        
 173. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). 
 174. Id. §§ 78 dd-1 to -3 (2006). 
 175. See Courts Reject Bright-Line Approach to Defining “Foreign Official” in Favor of Fact-
Based Approach, Creating Greater Uncertainty for Business, WHITE & CASE LLP 2 n.5 (Mar. 21, 
2012), http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/alerts-Courts-
Reject-Bright-Line-Approach.pdf. 
 176. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 43–44; see also Robert Zoellick, Opinion, Ques-
tions for the World’s Next Trade Chief, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
5f9f5ece-923a-11e2-851f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2PGbI4Atv. Zoellick notes the centrality of 
SOEs to many of the world’s economies and discusses the problem they present to basic rules of 
global trade. He argues: 
The increased importance of SOEs in the world economy—in financial ser-
vices, telecommunications, steel, chemicals and energy, and other natural re-
sources—requires new rules so that private businesses can compete fairly with 
state capitalism. The rules need not push privatisation or rollbacks of state en-
terprises, but they should require transparency, commercial behaviour, decla-
rations of subsidies, nondiscrimination and open procurement. 
Id. 
 177. U.S. authorities argue that “[b]ribes to public doctors can have a detrimental effect on the 
public health care systems that potentially pay more for products procured through greed and corrup-
tion.” See SEC Charges Johnson & Johnson with Foreign Bribery, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-87.htm. 
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would avoid the statute’s sweep if a gift was given “in order to assist” the 
payor to obtain or retain business.178 
Federal enforcement authorities practically demand that companies 
voluntarily conduct internal investigations, disclose potential violations, 
and cooperate with federal investigations.179 While the government notes 
that it may provide some relief to companies who take such steps, uncer-
tainty as to the reaction of the DOJ and SEC to these disclosures renders 
these assurances inherently unreliable.180 That is, even for those compa-
nies that voluntarily conduct internal investigations and disclose their 
findings to the government in good faith, these good faith efforts may not 
save them from the FCPA’s harsh enforcement regime.  
Furthermore, under the particularly draconian guidelines issued by 
the Office of Management and Budget, not only may a person or firm 
found in violation of the FCPA be barred from doing business with the 
federal government, but also an indictment alone, without conviction, 
can lead to a suspension of the right to do business with the U.S. gov-
ernment.181 Interestingly, and perhaps heartening given the gift-giving 
culture of various TPP nations, the FCPA’s legislative history shows that 
bribery was not considered a universal moral wrong.182 While bribery 
                                                        
 178. See Michael B. Runnels & Adam M. Burton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and New 
Governance: Incentivizing Ethical Foreign Direct Investment in China and Other Emerging Econo-
mies, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 295, 296 (2012). 
 179. Id. at 322–23. 
 180. Corporate compliance efforts are being further threatened by the new SEC whistleblower 
bounty program, part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. U.S. 
companies have expended significant time, resources, and funds to develop robust internal reporting 
mechanisms to identify and remedy misconduct. Under this program, a whistleblower may circum-
vent internal reporting channels and go directly to the SEC to report misconduct. Whistleblowers 
stand to receive a windfall with little incentive to report such conduct internally. This is compounded 
by advertisements by plaintiff’s attorneys luring individuals to blow the whistle on their employer 
with the promise of “substantial compensation, potentially millions of dollars.” Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Reporting Center, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTING CTR., 
http://www.foreign-corrupt-practices-act.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 181. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 37, at 5; see also Trautman 
& Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 37, at 147.  
 182. When Congress adopted the FCPA in 1977, it quickly became an important component of 
the Carter Administration’s efforts to use corporate behavior as a lever to promote Western values. 
Evidencing the significant concern that the FCPA’s adoption would result in an economic disad-
vantage for the U.S. in international business, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll 
argued that “[i]t is tempting to try to deal with the situation unilaterally, but there are serious risks 
for the United States in such an approach. There is widespread recognition in the Congress that such 
unilateral action would put U.S. companies at a serious disadvantage in the export trade.” Abuses of 
Corporate Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Priorities & Economy in Gov’t of the Joint 
Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 153–154 (1976). Indeed, while it was initially a symbolic component of 
the Carter Administration’s efforts—that was scarcely enforced—the past ten years have seen the 
DOJ and the SEC initiate an extraordinarily dramatic surge in FCPA enforcement. WINSTON & 
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does distort markets, there are a number of TPP countries where the cul-
ture permits, or even requires, the kind of practices that the FCPA, 
broadly interpreted, prohibits.183 
Although the purpose of the FCPA is to deter bribery in a manner 
that aids the United States in building international economic and politi-
cal alliances, recent empirical studies reveal that the dogmatic applica-
tion of the statute contributes to an erosion of the position of U.S. corpo-
rations in certain countries.184 In countries where bribery is considered 
relatively common,185 the FCPA’s current enforcement regime is ineffec-
tive, if not counterproductive, in preventing corruption in the host coun-
try.186 U.S. companies subject to the FCPA are hard-pressed to compete 
in those countries and in some cases may be deterred from even trying. 
Corporations based in countries not subject to strictly enforced anti-
bribery legislation have taken advantage of this uneven playing field, and 
corruption continues there unabated.187 This dynamic creates a myriad of 
economic188 and foreign policy problems for the United States, particu-
                                                                                                                            
STRAWN LLP, FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES OVERVIEW (2009), available at 
http://www.acc.com/chapters/socal/upload/11-17-09-fcpa.pdf; see also Spalding, supra note 28, at 
400 (arguing that, if one begins from the premise that bribery is wrong, in toto, the only appropriate 
response would be to work towards reducing it). Spalding goes on to argue that “[t]he problem with 
this justification, however . . . [is that] there is simply no evidence that Congress, or any other delib-
erative body for that matter, has ever adopted this policy. As the legislative history shows, whether 
bribery is an absolute and universal moral wrong, which government should seek to immediately 
eradicate regardless of the economic implications, was heavily disputed in Congress. Unless and 
until politically accountable bodies adopt this principle, it should not be used to justify the enforce-
ment of a statute where fines have exceeded $1 billion for a single company.” Id. 
 183. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
184. See generally Spalding, supra note 28. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977  
to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 115–18 (2010) (arguing that the rise of China as an exporter 
of FDI directly challenges efficient FCPA enforcement, due to the endemic bribery suffusing Chi-
nese business culture); see also Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, 33 
CHINA BUS. REV. 22, 22 (2006) (explaining “[w]idespread corruption in China puts many U.S. com-
panies between the proverbial rock and a hard place. . . . China’s leaders have long acknowledged 
that widespread corruption is one of the country’s main problems and have repeatedly vowed to 
eliminate it,” though to little discernable effect); Pei, supra note 34; Andrew Brady Spalding, The 
Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 354, 392–95 (2011)  (describing the seemingly progressive Chinese anti-bribery legislation 
as a façade, Spalding argues that while China has an interest in enforcing domestic prohibitions to 
project a more favorable image and attract FDI, China’s lack of meaningful overseas bribery prohi-
bitions gives it a great competitive advantage). Spalding concludes by noting that “despite China’s 
symbolic efforts, there is little reason to doubt that Chinese companies will continue to pay bribes in 
developing countries without fear of penalty.” Id. 
 188. See generally Runnels & Burton, supra note 178. In a 1999 report to Congress, the Con-
gressional Research Service, a nonpartisan group that provides analysis on legislative issues, esti-
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larly considering China’s aggressive investment in developing econo-
mies of the Pacific Rim. By enforcing the FCPA without regard to its 
collateral effects, the U.S. unwittingly sacrifices the geopolitical objec-
tives of the TPP in order to combat bribery abroad.189 
B. Policy Recommendations to Reform the FCPA 
While deterring bribery is certainly a worthy goal, it is far wiser to 
deter bribery as part of an ongoing business relationship, rather than as a 
prerequisite to conducting business or, especially, U.S. foreign policy. 
Foreign cultures view acceptable gifts quite differently from illegal 
bribes.190 By criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials, as defined 
under the FCPA, the U.S. is forcibly imposing its values regarding brib-
ery on other nations. Indeed, the overemphasis on policing corruption 
abroad, and the extraterritorial application of criminal sanctions, places 
U.S. companies at a substantial competitive disadvantage in seeking 
business relationships in countries where the culture permits the kind of 
practices that the FCPA considers corrupt.191 The geopolitical challenge 
                                                                                                                            
mated that the FCPA’s anti-bribery “provisions have cost up to [$1 trillion] annually in lost [U.S.] 
export trade.” MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30079, FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT (1999). In this vein, it may be useful to consider that the majority of countries with 
anti-bribery laws provide for an adequate procedures defense to liability. Corporations in those coun-
tries are able to defend against anti-bribery enforcement actions by showing that they had procedures 
and policies guarding against bribery in place. See Mike Koeler, The Compliance Defense Around 
the World, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 28, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/ 
compliance-defense-around-world.html (documenting a defense similar to an adequate procedures 
defense as part of anti-bribery statutes in the U.K., Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). 
 189. See James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business 
After 1977 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf (explaining that while U.S. FDI in corrupt countries saw 
significant declines as a result of the FCPA, no evidence exists to suggest that total FDI in such 
countries dropped). Indeed, other firms that were not constrained by anti-bribery legislation appar-
ently assumed the position once occupied by U.S. companies. As such, Hines argues that the princi-
pal effect of the FCPA is to divert U.S. FDI to less corrupt countries and, in those countries consid-
ered more corrupt, the FCPA operates to “encourage[] ownership substitution between [U.S.] and 
foreign investors.” Id. Ultimately, Hines demonstrates a persuasive argument that corruption-prone 
countries will increasingly turn to companies from countries without effective anti-corruption re-
gimes to replace the capital that the U.S. and its allies conclude are too much of a hazard to risk); see 
also Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 807, 814 (2006) 
(arguing that as the FCPA and other anti-bribery legislation adopted by OECD countries become 
more widespread and strictly enforced, corrupt countries will ultimately receive less of their FDI 
from less corrupt countries and more of their FDI from more corrupt countries, which turns the poli-
cy priorities of the FCPA completely on its head). 
 190. Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 155, 165 (2009). 
 191. See Salbu, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 28 and accompanying text; Salbu, 
Bribery in the Global Market, supra note 28 and accompanying text; Duncan, supra note 28 and 
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presented by China should encourage U.S. policymakers to revisit the 
text and enforcement regime of the FCPA so that the law will be a more 
effective tool, without disincentivizing U.S. corporations from investing 
in the developing world. The following section provides three concrete 
recommendations that harmonize the objectives of the FCPA with the 
TPP. 
1. Recommendation One: Amend the FCPA to Provide a Safe Harbor 
Provision for Corporations that Voluntarily Conduct Internal Investiga-
tions, Disclose Potential Violations, and Cooperate with Government 
Investigations 
Corporations that operate vigorous compliance programs and vol-
untarily report their misconduct should receive the benefit of a presump-
tion against criminal prosecution. This recommendation does not offer 
amnesty to those corporations engaging in good faith self-reporting. The 
government may still impose civil fines robust enough to constitute more 
than the cost of doing business, and the safe harbor provision should not 
be available for corporations engaging in serial violations over a short 
period of time. However, removing the specter of criminal enforcement 
will produce more business certainty as to what reductions in penalties 
will occur for self-reporting. Such an amendment is likely to incentivize 
voluntary disclosure and the adoption of polices that are transparent, 
demonstrating to the DOJ and SEC that such a corporation poses no sig-
nificant corruption threat.192 Such a corporation should be able to engage 
in international business operations without potentially facing criminal 
prosecution for voluntarily disclosing their own misconduct in good 
faith. 
2. Recommendation Two: Prohibit the Barring of an Indicted Corpora-
tion from Doing Business with the United States Without a Conviction 
Corporations that are indicted under the FPCA may be barred from 
doing business with the U.S. government, even if the indictment does not 
result in a conviction.193 This is particularly dangerous for U.S. corpora-
tions involved in transportation, defense, energy, and other sectors of the 
economy that necessarily involve contracts with the government and 
which are viewed as especially prone to bribery in the developing 
                                                                                                                            
accompanying text; see also Spalding supra note 28 (arguing the current FCPA enforcement regime 
is “not just deterring bribery, but is deterring investment”). 
 192. See Spalding, supra note 28. 
 193. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 37, at 5; see also Trautman 
& Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 37, at 147. 
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world.194  Indeed, these industries are precisely those that constitute the 
SOEs of TPP members. Legitimate issues of procedural justice notwith-
standing,195 the practice of barring corporations from doing business with 
the U.S. government without a conviction likely deters those corpora-
tions from investing in countries perceived to be more corrupt,196 upend-
ing both the FCPA’s and the TPP’s goal of promoting U.S. corporate 
investment in emerging markets. As such, the application of such a se-
vere penalty should be proscribed. 
3. Recommendation Three: Clarify the FCPA’s Definition of “Anything 
of Value,” “Instrumentality,” and “Foreign Official” 
As noted earlier, the FCPA provides no de minimis value for its 
prohibition of providing “anything of value” to “foreign officials.”197 The 
DOJ notes that the FCPA covers “payments to low-ranking employees 
and high-level officials alike.”198 Given that U.S. companies are strictly 
prohibited from providing anything of value, even in trivial amounts, that 
could be construed as intended to gain a business advantage,199 the stat-
ute should be amended to allow for the type of gift-giving that is typical 
of many of the TPP-negotiating nations. 
Other ambiguities in the FCPA that require clarity are the defini-
tions of “foreign official” and “instrumentality.” As noted previously,200 
the statute fails to define “instrumentality in its definition of “foreign 
official.” Moreover, courts fail to define the term with any precision.201 
                                                        
 194. Bribe Payers Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
 195. For a thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see the series of entries at FCPA BLOG: 
NEWS AND VIEWS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/tag/respondeat-superior. Dick Cassin, the blog author, argues that in 
order to avoid the catastrophic effects of any potential conviction, “companies have to settle with the 
government. So they rush into agreements that may require them to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege, hand over employees’ private documents and data, cut off support for their legal defense, and 
fire those who don’t cooperate with government investigations.” Richard L. Cassin, Naked Corpo-
rate Defendants, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009, 08:28 EST), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/ 
1/22/naked-corporate-defendants.html. 
 196. Hines, Jr., supra note 189 and accompanying text; see also Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 
189, at 814 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Runnels & Burton, supra note 178. 
 198. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 37, at 20–21. 
 199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2006). 
 200. See supra pp. 108–16. 
 201. See, e.g., Recent Case, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—”Foreign Official”—Eleventh 
Circuit Defines “Government Instrumentality” Under the FCPA–United States v. Esquenazi, 752 
f.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014), Cert. Denied, 135 S. Ct. 293 (2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1500, 1507 
(2015). A recent Eleventh Circuit Decision purported to define “foreign official” and “instrumentali-
ty.” The authors, however, found the Court’s definition unavailing and argued that the Court 
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Therefore, it is unclear what types of entities, including SOEs, are in-
strumentalities of a foreign government such that their employees will be 
considered foreign officials under the FCPA. Given the dominant role of 
SOEs in TPP members’ economies, and the DOJ’s interpretations of the 
FCPA, some U.S. corporations worry that “everyone they deal with is a 
foreign official because they work for an SOE.”202 As such, the statute 
could be amended to indicate both what percentage of government own-
ership and what extent of control by a government will qualify a corpora-
tion as an instrumentality. For these reasons, the FCPA should be 
amended to provide a clear definition of “anything of value,” “instru-
mentality,” and “foreign official.” 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has three major objectives with regard to the 
TPP: (1) counterbalancing the rise of Chinese hegemony; (2) strengthen-
ing old alliances and building new ones; and (3) reforming the economic 
architecture of the region in a way that ensures adherence to international 
law, customs, and norms. Relatedly, the policy objective of the FCPA is 
to deter bribery in a manner that aids the U.S. in building international 
economic and diplomatic alliances in developing countries. At the center 
                                                                                                                            
received a rare opportunity to clarify the scope of a term that lies at the heart 
of a contentious criminal statute. Although the court purported to define “in-
strumentality” with an eye toward helping companies and regulators deter-
mine which SOEs fall within the FCPA’s reach, it ultimately provided un-
wieldy guidelines that lower courts are unlikely to refine. Operating against a 
backdrop void of judicial exegesis, risk-averse businesses will continue to set-
tle enforcement actions exclusively out of court, leaving unabated the legal 
haze that currently envelops the FCPA. 
Id. 
 202. See Declaration of Prof. Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Counts One through Ten of the Indictment, at 447, United States v. Carson (No. SACR 09-00077-
JVS), 2011 WL 7416975 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011); see also Richard L. Cassin, In the Master’s 
Defense, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 24, 2008, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/11/24/in-the-
masters-defense.html (one commentator observes that “nothing magnifies the impact of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act on corporations more than respondeat superior,” the common law doctrine by 
which employers are held vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees); PAOLA DESIO, AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVIEW.pdf. 
Desio notes:  
Criminal liability can attach to an organization whenever an employee of the 
organization commits an act within the apparent scope of his or her employ-
ment, even if the employee acted directly contrary to company policy and in-
structions. An entire organization, despite its best efforts to prevent wrongdo-
ing in its ranks, can still be held criminally liable for any of its employees’ il-
legal actions. 
Id. 
2015] Rising to China's Challenge in the Pacific Rim 143 
of both policies lies the critical importance of forging international alli-
ances to further the U.S.’s global strategic interests. The enforcement 
regime of the FCPA, however, operates as a poison pill to these interests. 
The geopolitical challenge of a rising China in the zero-sum game to re-
write the rules of global trade should encourage U.S. policymakers to 
revisit the text and enforcement regime of the FCPA. The statute should 
be amended to ensure its effectiveness in curbing corporate bribery with-
out curbing corporate investment in the developing world. 
 In light of the U.S.’s core strategic interests in the Pacific Rim and 
the fair administration of justice, Congress should consider amending the 
FCPA in a manner consistent with this Article’s recommendations. 
Without the recommended changes, the FCPA will unintentionally un-
dermine the goals of the TPP by continuing to provide outsized penalties 
for conduct that is not only accepted, but also expected, in many Asian 
countries.203 
 
                                                        
 203. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
